This paper explores single variable profiling generally and racial profiling specifically to isolate why the use of race as a variable for profiling is normatively impermissible. I argue that the normative impermissibility of racial profiling does not lie in its instrumental unsuitability as a predictive variable. This is evidenced by the permissibility of the use of other single-variables for profiling. Rather, I argue that the normative impermissibility of racial profiling lies with the painful history of the misuse of race (specifically racial differences) as a signifier for human value throughout history.
Building off literature about pragmatic and moral encroachment, I demonstrate that modern objections to racial profiling stem from concerns about the stakes involved with the practice, particularly if profiling ends up targeting innocent individuals. I then proceed to examine the widespread acceptance of other forms of single-variable profiling in society and conclude that the impermissibility of racial profiling is not to do with the use of single-variable profiling but rather something to do with race specifically.
I pay particular attention to how race becomes a signifier for bigoted attitudes over time and highlight the troubles disentangling those attitudes from the use of race as a variable in profiling. I show that the existence of these stakes relates to historically contingent circumstances and not with race as a variable a priori. I conclude that whilst racial profiling may be permissible and effective at a theoretical level, our commitment to contextualise historical injustices perpetrated on the basis of race prohibit the use of racial profiling as a governing strategy and that a state committed to addressing those injustices cannot use race as a variable.